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1 | INTRODUCTION
An efficiently functioning financial system is seen as a requirement for stable economic growth (King and Levine,
1993). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the financial crisis of 2007–2008 forced authorities around the world to
re-evaluate existing financial regulations, as well as introduce new ones (Alrabiah, 2018). These regulations sought
to combat the very risks that materialised during and in the run-up to the financial crisis, such as credit, market and
liquidity risks (Aebi et al., 2012). They came at the same time as a number of key digital technological advances, which in
turn facilitate what has come to be termed Regulatory Technology (Regtech).
The literature on effective regulatory reporting is important because, according Nouy (2014), both regulatory
and financial reporting are cornerstones of effective banking supervision and financial stability. In her role as Chair
of the European Central Banks Supervisory Board, she argues that regulatory reporting provides useful information
to shareholders as well as regulators. It enhances communication between companies. Given the importance of
reporting, the information contained in such reports should be understandable, relevant and comparable across
different jurisdictions.
Themain difference between financial and regulatory reporting is the audience. Financial reports, such as financial
statements prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), are mainly targeted to
investors and creditors, whereas regulatory reports are based on the IFRS or Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV).
Such outputs are largely targeted at banking regulators and supervisors. Due to this difference in audience, financial
and regulatory reporting deviate in their scope of application. Regulatory reporting has a narrower focus than financial
reporting, meaning that only investment firms and credit institutions are required to adhere to these rules.
The importance of regulatory reporting is clear when looking at the statistics. Every year the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) receives over 500,000 planned regulatory reports from financial institutions, as well as any additional
ad hoc reports (FCA, 2018). According to the Central Bank of Ireland, (2017) regulatory reporting is a crucial piece in
effective bank supervision and regulatory returns inform the central bank of an individual bank’s risk profile.
The importance of financial reporting, rather than just regulatory reporting, is also significant. Acharya and Ryan
(2016) argue that the standard of financial reporting by banks is central in restraining banks’ accumulation of debt and
risk during economic expansion, while mitigating their harmful (potentially systemic) consequences during economic
downturns. The authors state that well-chosen reporting requirements could help banks and their regulators to better
understand issues such as liquidity requirements, futuremacroeconomic conditions and loss exposures. In addition,
fraudulent financial statements (FFS) is a prominent issue and can lead to sub-optimal allocation of capital, increased
credit risk and loss of public faith Omar et al. (2017). This paper explores these and other regulator reporting issues in
further depth through the lens of the literature.
2 | TECHNOLOGY IN BANKS’ REPORTING FUNCTION (REGTECH)
Technology is changing theway banks report. Buckley et al. (2019) argue that the abundance of required reports has
triggered a ‘RegTech revolution’ in the heavily regulated European financial industry. RegTech is a combination of the
words ‘regulatory’ and ‘technology’ and specifies the use of technology, especially information technology, in the space
of regulatory reporting, monitoring and compliance Arner et al. (2018)
As the financial industry is becomingmore digitized and standardised, more resources have been directed towards
better and more efficient use of the regulatory data, both in the interest of reducing compliance costs, as well as
generating new opportunities. Indeed, financial institutions are continually forced to invest large amounts of money on
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new software and IT systems, in order to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. Conversely, regulators must
invest money in various datamanagement systems capable of handling and analysing the received data. This, in turn
leads tomore data requested for financial institutions, leading to another RegTech cycle Buckley et al., (2019). 67 per
cent of ITmanagers spend at least USD 250,000 both on the implementation andmaintenance of a single regulation
and 3 percent spend up to USD 25m (Gordon, 2017). This highlights the importance of RegTech in oversight of financial
institutions by referring to a Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) action against the American bankMerrill Lynch for
reporting failures in October 2017. The authors state that only through technological solutions couldMerrill Lynch
have filed the appropriate reports. Conversely, the FCA’s detection of this discrepancy was significantly more likely
through the use of RegTech thanwithout it.
The FCA (2018) state that a move to amore digital reporting function could benefit both firms and regulators. For
instance, the costs of data submissions could be reduced and their accuracy increased and any changes or amedments to
regulatory requirements could be put into actionmore quickly. In addition, lower compliance costs could lower barriers
to entry to themarket and therefore promote competition.
In order to promote the growth of digital reporting, the FCA collaborated with financial institutions at a TechSprint
event where the participants were able to develop a ’proof of concept’. This new development could potentially make
regulatory reports machine-readable and executable, giving the firmsmore control over their data, as well as automate
and streamline the process in general (FCA, 2018).
It is clear that financial institutions as well as financial regulators will continue to invest money in solutions based
on technologies such as artificial intelligence (A.I.), machine learning, natural language processing and big data analytics.
Many academics and authorities have pointed to the lower costs and better regulatory outcomes they such RegTech
solutions enable. While Bamberger (2009) argues that the downsides of new technologies are often ignored in the rush
of adopting new technologies, only the future will tell whether the industry has been successful in the implementation
of these technologies andwhether the forecasted pitfalls have been avoided.
3 | THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
Financial regulation has, post the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) become tighter. Goodhart et al. (1998) pointed to the
fact that most of the world’s countries had been shown to have a fragile structure in their financial systems. In fact, from
the start of the 1980s until themid 1990s, 133 of the 181member countries of the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF)
had experiences significant problems in their banking sector, with 36 of these countries having experienced a full-scale
crisis.
Goodhart et al. (1998) detail the importance of financial sector regulation. The authors begin by pointing to the two
reasons for consumer protection; unsatisfactory business conduct as a consequence of information asymmetry and the
failure of a fund-keeping institution, where the latter could also lead to wider systemic issues. The authors explain that
the failure of a single institution could potentially instigate a bank run, i.e. a situation wheremembers of the public lose
their faith in the financial system and seek to withdraw their savings in the first instance. These bank runs can be highly
contagious and can lead to banks becoming insolvent, which can then have devastating consequences for the wider
economy
The rationale behind systemic regulation, which is neededwhen the social costs of a bank failure exceed the private
costs, and the potential costs of the failure, are not incorporated in the current bank decision-making. The nature of
bank contracts, where in case of insolvency potential loan-buyers have asymmetric information on the nature of the
assets, make them difficult to sell on a secondarymarket. Moral hazard, due to bank safety net arrangements, mean that
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central banks act as the lender-of-last-resort.
Jeffers (2013) argues that banks are indirectly encouraged to take on undue risk, as they are aware of the govern-
ment’s backing, which is inevitable in a case of a crisis, thus leading tomoral hazard. The termmoral hazard is usually
used when referring to banks that are ‘too-big-to-fail’ (also referred to as Global Systemically Important Banks or
G-SIBs), that is, institutions whose collapse could potentially trigger a worldwide depression.
Asmentioned, the financial crisis changed the backdrop. In this respect,Weber (2010) discussed the objectives of
financial regulation from a post-crisis perspective. According toWeber, financial stability, market integrity and trust, in
both systems as well as other people, are key areas of regulatory focus. Weber states that financial stability is perhaps
themost important area of financial regulation, as it is closely linked to stable economic growth and in general to the
performance and functioning of the economic system. Weber states that financial stability can be difficult to define,
however a widely used definition is by Schinasi (2006), who defines financial stability as “. . . the ability of the financial
system to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage risks and absorb shocks”.
Weber’s second point –market integrity – entails the prevention andmitigation of criminal activity, such as money
laundering, corruption and terrorist financing. Weber argues thatmarket integrity is essential a well-functioningmarket
and one of its key tasks is to prevent a loss in public confidence from happening. Lastly,Weber refers to fair conduct of
business when discussing the trust aspect in financial regulation. Weber argues that this aspect aims to protect both
investors and consumers, along with ensuring the functioning of the financial system and giving financial institutions
(FIs) the premise to fulfil their functions in an appropriate manner.
Having reviewed the the rationale of financial regulation, it seems clear that the regulation of financial institutions
is needed for a variety of reasons, such as the systemic importance of the financial sector for the wider economy,
informational asymmetry betweenfirms and consumers andmoral hazard associatedwith bank safety net arrangements,
such as central bank bail-outs. The rationale for regulation is evenmore clear when examining the statistics brought
forward by Goodhart et al. (1998); the recurring significant problems and financial crises within the IMF member
countries serve as a good reminder that the GFC was not simply an erroneous step from the financial industry, but
rather a continuation of a trendwhich culminated to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1920s
and 1930s.
The GFCwas a reminder on the importance of consumer and investor protection. Mis-selling of various financial
products was commonplace in the run-up to the crisis by high-profile banks such as Lloyds and JPMorgan Chase (Erturk,
2016), which eroded the public confidence towards the industry actors and the financial system in general.
A well-functioning financial system is a requirement for stable economic growth. As public confidence is a central
piece of a well-functioning financial system, it is hardly surprising that academics and authorities alike strive to do
their best to protect both the safety and soundness of the financial system, as well as ensure that issues regarding
informational asymmetry and bank runs aremitigated.
4 | REGULATORY FAILURES EXPOSED BY THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
After the worst of the GFCwas weathered, academics started to examine the regulatory frailties uncovered by the
crisis. Based on this research, combinedwith other expert opinions, legislators and authorities started to implement
changes to regulatory standards.
Alrabiah (2018) states that the information asymmetry between regulators and banks was a critical issue that
was exposed by the global financial crisis. Alrabiah specifically attributes to bank regulatory reporting and argues that
inefficient information exchangemodels, disintegrated business processes and general non-integration between bank
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regulatory reporters supervisors impeded proactive intervention by the regulators, which could havemitigated the
effects of the GFC.
Jardelot andMitov (2015), Mochon (2016) and Ehrenfeld (2016) argue that the financial crisis revealed the opaque-
ness and inadequate supervision of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and securities financingmarkets. Jardelot and
Mitov (2015) state that the interconnectedness of OTC derivatives and lack of transparency were key contributing
factors in the build-up of systemic risk and systemic contagion. In addition, Jardelot and Mitov point to the limited
transparency of market developments and counterparty relationships as being exposed by the crisis. Lastly, Mochon
(2016) points to overall lack of transparency and financial engineering as key causes for the GFC.
According to Rattaggi (2017) data quality, consistency, validation, accuracy and timeliness are key when striving
for compliance with the Basel II/III regulatory requirements and issues in these areas were exposed by the GFC.
Prorokowski (2015) states that insufficient investor protection, unclear derivatives regulations and poor market
transparency with respect to trading and investor protection were issues uncovered by the global financial crisis.
Tykoczinski (2014) argues that the lack of a strong enough riskmanagement framework for industry participants was
one of the reasons that led to the crisis.
Barth and Landsman (2010) meanwhile observed that the level of disclosure regarding derivatives and asset
securitizations was insufficient for investors tomake informed decisions on the risk levels of banks. This, in part was
once of the causes for the GFC. In addition, according to Pinnuck (2012) and Acharya and Ryan (2016), fair value
accounting (which could theoretically give the banks the chance to distort their financial statements and thus their
financial and regulatory reports), was not in itself a cause to the GFC. However, a weakness might have persisted in the
application of fair value accounting that contributed to the crisis (Pinnuck, 2012; Acharya and Ryan, 2016).
The literature does not support the claim that fraudulent financial reporting was a key cause for the financial crisis.
Fraudulent financial reporting signifies themanipulation of financial figures by overstating profit, revenue and assets
or understating expenses, liabilities or losses (Omar et al., 2017). Instead, Pinnuck (2012) and Barth and Landsman
(2010) foundmore evidence on the insufficient disclosure regarding derivatives and asset securitizations leading to
less-informed investors and less-than-optimal allocation of capital.
That is not to say that fraudulent financial statements (FFS) have not been an issue in both the pre- and post-crisis
world. In fact, McCuaig (2006) argues that, despite many attempts to do so, corporate financial reporting had not
improved in the three decades leading to the global financial crisis. These attempts included reforms such as Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Internal Control-Integrated Framework. Instead, fraudulent financial reporting continued being an
issue.
Chen (2016) argues that a growing number of fraudulent financial statements have the capacity to damage compa-
nies and culminate in significant losses for investors. In addition, Omar et al. (2017) argue that FFS lead to sub-optimal
allocation of capital, increased credit risk and loss of public faith. Therefore, Chen argues that establishing a robust
FFS detectingmodel is extremely important andOmar et al. (2017) state that auditors, accountants and companies in
general must bemore vigilant in combating financial fraud. According to Katsis et al. (2012) auditors are expected to
identify this fraudulent behaviour, however, limitations, such as human error, negligence and fraud have been reported
issues in the auditing field (Tackett et al., 2004). Lastly, Pinnuck (2012) and Katsis et al. (2012) argue that performance
incentives, namely in the executive level, may have led to fraudulent accounting practices by financial institutions,
ultimately leading to fraudulent financial statements and reports.
Considering the findings in the literature, it is fair to state that the objectives of financial regulation – as discussed
by Goodhart et al. (1998) andWeber (2010) – were not met during and in the run-up to the crisis, as the literature does
indeed seem to indicate that various regulatory failures were exposed.
Particular focus was given to the level of disclosure, opaqueness, lack of transparency and poor communication
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between firms, regulators and consumers in general. In fact, multiple authors deemed the derivatives market as opaque,
inadequately supervised and too interconnected, thus contributing towards the systemic risk and systemic contagion.
Consumer protection, especially in terms of information asymmetry, in this case the inability to reliably evaluate the
riskiness of an investment and/or institution, was also brought forward.
In addition, while fraudulent financial reporting (a potential threat towards reliable financial and regulatory report-
ing) did not seem to have amajor impact on the recent crisis, certain weaknesses were found in the application of fair
value accounting. Additionally, many academics agree that fraudulent financial reporting can increase banking risks and
erode public confidence and as stated byMcCuaig (2006), the standard of financial reporting had not increased in the
decades leading up to GFC, despite many attempts to do so.
Therefore, considering the shortcomings in bank disclosure standards and the importance of the reporting function
in general, it is reasonable to assume that regulators should take action and seek to improve the level of both financial
and regulatory reporting.
5 | SUBSEQUENT REPORTING REQUIREMENT CHANGES
Authorities aimed to fix the opaqueness of the banking sector by demandingmore information from the firms. According
to Mochon (2016) and Buckley et al. (2019), various new reporting requirements for financial institutions were
implemented post-crisis by the European authorities.
Themost important of these initiatives, according to Buckley et al. (2019), were as follows: CRD IV for the banking
sector, AIFMD for the asset management sector, MiFID II for financial markets and EMIR for market infrastructure.
Other notable reporting requirements include SFTR, REMIT, Dodd-Frank and IFRS 9 (Jardelot andMitov, 2015;Miu
andOzdemir, 2017;Mochon, 2016). The requirements were largely done to improve the level of regulatory reporting,
however, CRD IV and IFRS 9 both contain requirements for improved financial reporting. We break down the reporting
requirement changes to specific directives and laws in Appendix 1.
In order to combat the regulatory failures and blind spots exposed by the global financial crisis, the regulators did
in fact seem to focus on improving disclosure and market transparency. Possibly the most prominent topic brought
forward by academics was the inadequate transparency of derivatives. The regulationsMiFID II, EMIR, REMIT, CRD IV
andDodd-Frank were in large part designed to combat the opaqueness of derivatives contracts. Consumer protection,
investor protection and information asymmetry were also topics brought forward by academics. Regulations such as
AIFMD, SFTR and Dodd-Frank all had provisions intended to combat these shortcomings in regulatory compliance.
In addition, the increased level of disclosure was widely intended to increasemarket integrity and preserve systemic
stability.
Prorokowski (2015), Tykoczinski (2014), Cadmus (2012) and Greenberger (2013) also discussed the potential risks
includedwith the implementation of new regulations. Both Prorokowski and Tykoczinski suggested the use of external
service providers in handling the renewed technological, as well as informational aspects introduced by theMiFID II
and AIFMD regulations. Cadmus and Greenberger pointed to the potential systemic importance of derivatives clearing
organizations and argued that access to the clearingmarket should be kept open.
Nevertheless, the amount of new regulations intended to combat the shortcomings exposed by the financial crisis
shows that regulators have at leastmade efforts in trying to improve the core functions of the financial system. However,
it is unclear how the regulatory reforms are going to work in practice andwhether any issues arise from the required
outsourcing as discussed by Prorokowski (2015) and Tykoczinski (2014). Therefore, additional research is required on
this field in the future. We conclude that distributed technologies are a possible regulatory blind spot and one in which
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we urge diligent focus on by regulators.
6 | TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS IN BANKS’ REPORTING FUNCTION
The increased reporting requirements have forced both banks and regulators to innovate in their approach to the data
handling and data analysis. Buckley et al. (2019) state that the changed regulatory landscape of Europe has forced
both the industry, as well as its regulators, to digitize its data collection and regulatory reporting in a comprehensive
way. Indeed, as discussed, the goal of the TechSprint by the FCA (2018) was to automate the reporting process, aiming
for a more streamlined approach to reporting. Butler (2017) argues that RegTech has the potential to help financial
institutionsmake their regulatory reporting functionmore efficient and effective.
Kavassalis et al. (2018) argue that flexibility, timeliness and speed are all major features of a regulatory regime that
can effectively diminish the potentially dangerous occurrences in the financial system. According to the authors, the
current analytical and reporting processes experience vast difficulties in delivering such a high standard of performance,
both in terms of organisation, data architecture and technical infrastructure.
In fact, Kavassalis et al. (2018) argue that, while the number of reported derivatives contracts to local trade
repositories (TRs) hadmore than tripled from under 10million in 2013 tomore than 30million in 2016, there are still
major organisational inefficiencies often resulting in data fragmentation and issues with quality consistency of the
collected data. For instance, issues with data collection, such as trade execution and price timestamps, aggregating
similar data and comparing data fromdifferent sources have been frequently reported (Chen et al., 2011; Gordon, 2017).
Furthermore, the authors state that the current reporting and analytical processes would experience considerable
difficulties in delivering reliable results when dealing in the increasingly complex and automated financial system.
The authors claim that new reporting requirements, such as BCBS 239 , require a ‘radical re-engineering’ of IT
systems used by financial institutions. The inefficiency of these systems, combinedwith slow industry adaptation, may
delay, and thus undermine, the intended benefits of these regulations, which according to Houstoun et al. (2015), is a
regular occurrence in the industry.
Therefore, Kavassalis et al. (2018) present a new innovative approach to supervisory reporting and financial risk
monitoring, using various technologies such as algorithmic financial contract standards, distributed ledger, document
engineering methods and automated legal text. The authors argue that this approach, based on RegTech, has the
potential to curb costs associatedwith compliance and supervision, aswell as decrease the operational risk of potentially
inappropriate data handling.
In the approach, a bearer service generates and subsequently maintains a Dynamic Transaction Document (DTD),
which forms a standardised data facility. This DTD also allows, via a Distributed Ledger (DL), relevant authorities to
request and process important contract data received from the transaction counterparties. The authors conclude by
stating that anybodywith access to the DL can view and verify this ’quasi-simultaneous’ data. Kavassalis et al. (2018)
findmultiple benefits in this new RegTech-based reporting system, such as; integrating reports on transactions and
evolution of risk aggregates; closing the gap between the analytical and operational departments; reducing compliance
costs; increasing the transparency of the global financial system and; better regulatory compliance outcomes.
According toGrody (2018), the distributed ledger technology (DLT) has the potential to revolutionizemany areas of
the financial industry, including regulatory reports. DLT’s could provide a ledger which could be used by regulators and
variousmarket participants for activities such as data analysis and records storage. The risks of DLTwerementioned
earlier but it is relevant to point out that regulatory reporting is one of the functions that can also be improved by the
DLT technology. In fact, Grody sees the standardisation of regulatory reporting as one of the key priorities of regulators
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and argues that a key piece in the standardisation, XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language), has various benefits
for regulators. XBRL has already been in use in the financial industry since the year 2005 and is currently applied to
tax reports, financial statements, income statements and balance sheets among others. While XBRL is a relatively old
technology, its use has considerably increased in the past years.
The implementation of XBRL can be attributed to the post-crisis financial environment, where regulators deemed
it necessary to have access tomore granular transaction data, in order tomonitor systemic risk (Grody, 2018). Shah
(2018) lists some of the advantages of the XBRL language as facilitating access tomore granular data and the overall
improvement the reporting function. Shah uses the example of nine Singaporean banks developing a data taxonomy
standard based on XBRL, with the aim to streamline and simplify reporting. This changewas done after theMonetary
Authority of Singapore released a newmandate, requesting access to 300,000 plus data points, an enormous increase
from the previous 4,000+ data points. Colgren (2018) and Troshani et al. (2018) state that FIs are swiftly moving on
from paper and PDF reports, to amuchmore automated system. Using technologies such as the XBRL, the reported
information is exchanged and analysed without much human intervention. In fact, systems are continuously disseminat-
ing new information, allowing for real-time reporting. Business-to-business reporting is happening automatically, entity
to entity.
Regulators have tried to achieve industry-wide reporting standardisation inmany areas ever since the crisis, for
instance in derivatives such as swaps. This is understandable, considering howmany have pointed to credit default
swaps as one of the main culprits of the financial crisis (Stulz, 2010). Standardisation of the swap transactions data
would greatly help in monitoring the impact these securities have on the systemic stability, however, he also agrees that
regulators have not yet made adequate steps in this quest to standardisation.
International inconsistency and incompatibility in regulatory reporting is a direct consequence of the increased
number of standards and formats brought on by the new regulatory regimes. However, efforts towardsmore unified
standardisation have started in the past years, where regulators are looking to take advantage of technologies such as
XBRL, LEI (Legal Entity Identifier) and DPM (Data PointModel). Shah (2018) argues that, beyond its main objective of
identifying transaction counterparties in the derivativesmarket, the LEI can also streamline reporting and analysis oper-
ations. Chan andMilne (2019) estimate that the direct savings to the financial industry coming from the implementation
of LEI will most likely exceed USD 1bn per annum.
The ISO 20022 reporting standard allowsmarket participants all over the world to communicate with each other,
using consistent business terminology and formatting. In fact, theMiFID II regulation already leverages ISO 20022 in
helping to standardise and streamline the regulatory communication between firms and regulators. Shah argues that
further standardisation is needed in order to ensure the high effectiveness of regulatory reporting in the future.
Alrabiah (2018) found that the data required for regulatory reporting is currently not timely available to banks.
The root causes for this are non-value adding activities (waste) and performance variation. Waste refers to the issues
in data entry operator jobs, due to insufficient knowledge data andmanual data entry, as well as organisational and
managerial issues due to insufficient auditing and loss of qualified staff. Performance variation, on the other hand,
refers to issues such as not having planning and knowledgemanagement procedures, absence of fully integrated and
automated systems that offer consolidation and standardisation for all banks and high employment turnover leading to
decreased performance and productivity.
In addition to waste and performance variation, The use of two separate credit risk systems; foundation-internal
ratings-based (F-IRB) and advanced internal ratings-based (A-IRB), can lead to faulty data and increase in data variability
among banks. Furthermore, the two used systems can generally complicate the validation process and thus affect
decisionmaking. Mariathasan andMerrouche (2014) argue that this inability to validate and verify the data gives the
chance for banks tomanipulate andminimize their capital requirements. In addition, Amorello (2016) and Scannela
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(2013) both argue that the complexity and heterogeneity of the banking sector diminishes the efforts of the Basel
Committee’s to enhance credit risk assessment.
For the aforementioned reasons, Alrabiah (2018) proposed a regulatory reporting framework, which provides
a consolidated, standardised and integrated system for all financial institutions in dealing with the heterogeneous
banking domain. The framework enhances the regulatory reporting system by integrating a cloud computing network
with integrated, automated and standardised features. Alrabiah explains that roles such as Business ProcessManager,
Data Quality Regulator and KnowledgeManagement Engine help with the pitfalls of the previous reporting systems; it
standardises, validates, verifies and consolidates the gathered data, which is transported via an Enterprise Service Bus,
which decreases data entry time and protects the data integrity.
Mochon (2016) argues that asmore andmore data is created, the traditional monitoring tools are insufficiently
equipped in dealing with such a high volume of information, which is why big data solutions are needed. Yoost and
Mathaisen (2016) and Blackburn (2015) state that regulatory reporting, along with other areas in riskmanagement
can be improved by the use of big data and advanced analytics. Yedavalli (2018) discusses the benefits that Robotics
Process Automation (RPA) could potentially have for firms’ reporting function, stating that nowadays a large portion of
an individual worker’s day is spent ’data crunching’, leaving little time for the actual analysis.
Companies could potentially completely eliminate time crunching data, instead allowing the workers to spend their
time in amore productive way. According to Yedavalli, time could be potentially saved in both financial and regulatory
reporting. Asfinancialfirms aim for amore cost-effective and efficient approach, some are looking to utilize technologies
such as gap analysis, data preparation tools, consolidation and streamlining exercises, as well as third party vendor
delegation services in order to aid the analysis of the establishment of a robust foundation to any future regulatory
reporting initiatives.
Many academics have tried to combat the issue of fraudulent financial reporting by applying technological solutions
to financial statements. For instance Katsis et al. (2012) used an ants-based classification and Chen (2016) used a hybrid
datamining approach, both of which returned overall good results. Both of the authors also recommended the use of
their classifier as a support tool for auditors.
As an aside, Omar et al. (2017) predicted fraudulent financial reports using an artificial neural network, which
outperformed statistical techniques traditionally used to predict fraudulent financial reports. Other studies using
technology in detecting fraudulent financial statements are Gray andDebreceny (2014), Huang, Tsaih and Lin (2014)
and Huang, Tsaih and Yu (2014). All of the aforementioned studies were able to increase the effectiveness of fraud
detection by using a variety of tools, such as topological patterns, neural networks and text analysis.
Having reviewed the technological developments in banks’ reporting functions, it seems clear that a ’RegTech
revolution’, first alluded to by Buckley et al. (2019), is well underway. This is fairly unsurprising, as many academics, such
as Kavassalis et al. (2018), Shah (2018), Alrabiah (2018) andGrody (2018) argue that technology has the potential to
alleviate themajor inefficiencies that exist in the current reporting systems. These inefficiencies include; data issues
such as fragmentation, inconsistency, incompatibility, variability and issues with validation and verification; complexity
and heterogeneity of the banking sector; organizational issues such as performance variation andwaste and; inability
for the current reporting systems to handle the higher volume of information required by the new regulations.
Academics were also able to present potential solutions for these issues. In fact, Kavassalis et al. (2018) and
Alrabiah (2018) developed frameworks using various technologies such as distributed ledgers, automated legal texts
and cloud computing. Shah (2018) emphasized the importance of various standards such as LEI, DPM and ISO 20022 in
conjuction with XBRL. All of the authors argued that a vast number of benefits can be obtainedwith the implementation
of the frameworks, standards and technologies, such as improved monitoring of systemic stability, decreased costs,
lower operational risk, more streamlined reporting and analytics processes, improved communication, access tomore
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granular data and an increased transparency in the global financial system.
In terms of fraudulent financial reporting, various technological solutions, such as hybrid data mining, neural
networks, topological pattern and ants-based classification were presented in combating FFS. The results indicate that
these technologies can be a great help in assisting auditors and therefore prevent fraud and human error in the auditing
process, leading to better financial statements and financial reports.
To conclude, it seems clear that the lack of standardisation is the biggest single weakness of the current reporting
processes as pointed by various authors. Therefore, authorities should make the standardisation and harmonization of
these global reporting processes their single biggest priority.
7 | ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS - TECHNOLOGICAL REPORTING SYSTEMS
The effectiveness if regulatory reporting can be improved by technology solutions. According to Bamberger (2009),
downside risks are often either transferred, played down or even ignored in the rush of embracing new technologies.
Butler andO’Brien (2019) argue that this is could also be the case with RegTech; the authors state that many academics,
such as Arner et al. (2017), fail to observe risks, such as the ‘translation’ and the ‘Tower of Babel’ problems.
The translation problem refers to the gap between the intended behaviour of various automated processes and the
meaning allotted to business concepts by business professionals, as well as to the behaviours embedded in software
code and themeanings recorded by software engineers and systems analysts in data stores. Bamberger (2009) argues
that the translation problem led to financial, compliance and risk systems that concealed risk, led its users into a false
sense of security, as well as provided incorrect signals to business executives, ultimately resulting in substandard
decision-making on potential key issues.
The Tower of Babel problem is common in the financial industry, for instance by not having homogeneous and
generally agreed concepts and terms for similar business processes, objects and products. According to Butler and
O’Brien (2019) this is not only an issuewithin the industry, but also within institutions, where various different terms
may be used for similar processes across departments and/or communities of practice. The authors argue that the
emergence of FinTech and RegTechwill not be able to solve themost fundamental problems in the financial industry if
the Tower of Babel risk is left ignored.
Butler (2017) offers a solution based on semantic technologies, which allow meaning to be attached to data –
both structured and unstructured. This would, according to Butler, also require an implementation of standards-based
approachwhich would be necessary in addressing the issues of translation and Tower of Babel. Butler further argues
that this approach can address regulatory requirements in comprehensive, cohesive and coherentmanner, and can even
handle complex and voluminous regulatory requirements. In addition, Butler and O’Brien (2019) refer to ‘ontology-
basedmeta-datamodels’, whichwill helpmake bank systems semantically interoperable, help ameliorate the translation
problem and ultimately make digital regulatory reporting feasible for FIs.
Semantic tagging of regulations are viewed as a key part in addressing the Tower of Babel problem. According
to Shah (2018) the ISO 20022 –standard can also help in combating the Tower of Babel problem. He argued that the
standard allows amore streamlined communication amongmarket participants, using consistent business terminology
and formatting.
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8 | THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
Closely connected to the concerns about combating the Tower of Babel problem raised by Butler andO’Brien (2019);
Wagner (2018) and Gordon (2018) discuss the importance of organizational processes and culture in the context of
successful reporting function.
Wagner (2018) argues that regulatory and financial reports these days receive a diminishing amount of attention,
as preparers tend to treat them as compliance exercises only serving to fulfill irrelevant and unnecessary disclosure
requirements. This, according toWagner, is a consequence of the reporting being as complex as the underlying business
itself and end users largely do not have the resources to tackle this complexity. Wagner argues that the various
disclosure requirements should be principles-based instead of rules-based, which encourage regulatory reporters
towards a ’checklist mentality’.
WhileWagner, along with many other academics, argues for a more standardised and harmonized approach to
global financial and regulatory reporting, he also states that wrong kind of standardisation can easily lead to reporting
becoming too superfluous. Wagner argues that a ’one-size-fits-all’ approach in regards to reporting is bound to fail and
institutions should should be given flexibility in this regard.
Themost optimal implementation path for regulatory reporting is determined by a firm’s foundation. Moreover,
Gordon argues that the way for financial firms tomost effectively implement RegTech in their business models is down
to the infrastructure and resources they have available and no two paths will be identical between firms or regulations.
After reviewing the literature on the potential pitfalls of digital regulatory reporting, it is clear that some research
has been done in the field, most notably by Bamberger (2009), Butler (2017) and Butler andO’Brien (2019). The authors
pointed to twomain problems, translation and Tower of Babel, which can be extremely harmful if left untreated. For
instance, Bamberger (2009) argued that the translation problem can lead to risk concealment and poor decision-making.
The emergence of RegTech will not be able to solve the issue of poor communication in the financial industry if the
Tower of Babel problem is ignored.
We noted that higher disclosure requirements do not necessarily equal to better regulatory outcomes and that a
one-size fits all approach would be ‘bound to fail’. Themost effective way for a firm to implement RegTech in regulatory
reporting is dependent on the firm’s foundation, infrastructure and resources.
As pointed out by Butler andO’Brien (2019), many academics tend to ignore the downsides of new technologies.
This could be one potential reason for the limited amount of literature. In addition, as suggested byWagner (2018),
closemonitoring and academic research is needed on the effectiveness of higher disclosure requirements. Thus, more
research is needed in these fields in the future.
9 | SUGGESTIONS
Wesuggest further research is required into the reporting ecosystem. No research exists, for example, on the connection
of higher disclosure requirements and better regulatory outcomes andwould therefore stop the efforts towardsmore
disclosure requirements. This may be too harsh of a stance, however there is no denying that financial institutions are
facing huge challenges while striving to stay compliant with the new regulatory requirements. Nevertheless, academics
should conduct extensive research in the coming years on the link between higher disclosure requirements and better
regulatory outcomes.
In terms of actions by authorities; the performance of banks with the new reporting requirementsmust bemon-
itored, as these requirements effectively require the use of technological solutions, but also outsourcing in some
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instances. As listed bymany academics, these new regulatory requirements bring their own risks and it is paramount
that the developments in the field aremonitored closely. After all, the health of the financial sector is crucial for the
well-being of the society in general.
To conclude, themove tomore automation in banks’ reporting function is understandable considering themajor
inefficiencies discussed in the literature survey. Little doubt exists on the statement that the biggestweakness in current
reporting systems is the lack of standardisation and integration. Therefore, authorities should direct their biggest
efforts towards combating these issues before anymajor changes to technological standards are implemented.
10 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the reasons and rationale for financial regulation, what were some of the key causes behind
the global financial crisis, how bank reporting requirements have changed post-crisis, what technological solutions have
been offered for amore efficient reporting function and finally, what kind of issues and potential solutions have been
brought forward by prominent academics.
Our findings indicate that financial sector regulation is extremely important for a well-functioning financial system
and stable economic growth. Secondly, the rationale behind financial regulation includes an assumption of informational
asymmetry between financial institutions and consumers. Informational asymmetry, poormarket integrity and systemic
instability all weremajor contributors towards the crisis. Major inefficiencies existed in banks’ regulatory reporting
function. In addition, Despite the regulators’ efforts, the level of banks’ financial reporting had been poor for decades
leading up to the crisis, resulting in fraudulent financial statements.
We examined the various new reporting requirements implemented post-crisis. The literature indicated that
regulators had largely addressed the regulatory frailties uncovered by the GFC through regulations such as MiFID
II, EMIR, AIFMD, SFTR and Dodd-Frank, which focused largely on increased disclosure, protecting consumers and
preserving financial stability. However, these new regulations also posed potential risks and threats to systemic stability,
which is why further research is needed in the field.
We documented the effectiveness of current reporting systems and their ability to handle current and future
reporting requirements. Various authors pointed to the inefficiencies in the current reporting systems, such as data
fragmentation, data inconsistency, performance variation and generally the inability for the reporting systems to
handle the higher volume of information required by the new reporting directives. Solutions for these inefficiencies
included increased standardisation; the implementation of new technologies such as distributed ledger, XBRL and cloud
computing and; renewed frameworks based on globally agreed standards. Benefits of these new solutions included
lower compliance costs, improved reporting and analytics processes, access tomore granular data and bettermonitoring
of systemic stability.
We focused on the potential problems faced with the implementation of these new technologies. Authors dis-
cussed problems such as translation and Tower of Babel, which can both lead to poor decision-making and inaccurate
estimations of risk level. In addition, the fundamental issues of poor communication will persist if these problems are
left ignored.
The solutions we propose are based on those identified in the academic literature. They are increased standardisa-
tion through semantic technologies and ensuring that there is semantic interoperability between reporting systems
worldwide. As the implementation of technology tagging in reporting functions is dependent on individual firms, the ef-
fectiveness of regulatory reporting using RegTech will depend on the adoption of financial technology and the efficiency
benefits that they gain from its roll out.
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11 | APPENDIX 1 - REGULATORY REPORTING CHANGES
11.1 | MiFID II
The objective of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) reporting obligation is to create a more
integratedmarket environment within the European Union. It is designed to stimulate healthy competition, enhance
market discipline, provide clearer regulations for derivatives and upholdmarket transparency, particularly protecting
the buy-side of a transaction (Prorokowski, 2015).
The reporting requirements imposed by the bill include client suitability reports when dealing with retail customers
and trade reports for all assets encompassed by the regulation. In addition, the MiFID II regulation imposes near
real-time regulatory reporting, where for certain institutions a trade is captured and reported amere 15minutes after
execution. However, this comes at a cost, and Prorokowski (2015) argues that complying with theMiFID II regulation is
generally seen as technologically difficult, expensive and not suitable for all tradingmodels. In any case, Prorokowski
states that by approaching datamanagement vendors and outsourcing IT processes is themost efficient way in reducing
theMiFID II implementation costs.
11.2 | AIFMD
The Alternative Investment FundManagers Directive (AIFMD)was designed to enforce amore robust riskmanagement
framework for the alternative investment subsector of the asset management industry. The reporting requirements of
the directive are aimed to ensure that the information provided by the fundmanagers are up to date, accurate and truly
convey the actual risk profile of the investment vehicles (Tykoczinski, 2014).
Tykoczinski also argues that the huge increase in fund manager duties caused by the directive may prove to be
overwhelming to somemanagers, which is why fundmanagers may require assistance by external service providers in
their reporting duties, particularly regulatory risk reporting.
11.3 | EMIR
In order to counter the opaqueness in derivatives contracts, article 9 in EuropeanMarket Infrastructures Reform (EMIR)
mandated the counterparties to disclose details to an EMIR recognized trade depository, such as concluded contracts
or any derivatives contracts that the parties have terminated or modified. Trade depositories then collect andmaintain
the full record of all derivatives contracts. In addition, to further strengthen the reforms, higher capital requirements
are imposed for non-centrally authorised contracts (Mochon, 2016; Jardelot andMitov, 2015).
11.4 | CRD IV
The Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) looks to improve standards for counterparty risk, quantity and quality
of capital and liquidity and leverage requirements. In addition, the CRD IV regulation sets renewedmacroprudential
standards, such as countercyclical capital buffers for systemically important financial institutions (Bank of England,
2019).
The reporting requirementsmandated by the CRD IV are Common Reporting (COREP) and Financial Reporting
(FINREP), which cover areas such as large exposures, own funds and financial information, using the XBRL reporting
format (Bank of England, 2019).
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11.5 | SFTR
The Securities Financing Transaction Regulation (SFTR) mandates the following; all SF transactions to be reported
to trade repositories; information on the use of funds’ must be disclosed to investors and; minimum transparency
conditions to bemet until financial instruments intended to serve as collateral can be reused.
Jardelot andMitov (2015) state that the EU regulators were unable to quantify the systemic risk emanating from
securities financing transactions due to lack of comprehensive and timely data.
11.6 | IFRS 9
The objective of the International Financial Reporting Standard 9 (IFRS 9) is to create principles for the financial
reporting of both financial assets and financial liabilities. These reports will present useful and relevant information,
which will help in assessing the timing, uncertainty and amounts of an entity’s potential future cash flows (IFRS.org,
2019).
11.7 | REMIT
The Regulation onWholesale EnergyMarkets Integrity and Transparency (REMIT) regulation necessitates the reporting
and disclosure of derivatives trades of physical commodities. The REMIT regulation looks to prevent insider trading and
market manipulation (Peters and Vishnia, 2018).
11.8 | Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act was themost significant of the US post crisis regulation. The Title VII of the Dodd-Frank regulation
seeks tominimize systemic risk and provide transparency in the derivatives markets as well as cater credit protection
for traders. Under the regulation, Major Swap Participants (MSPs) and Swap Dealers (SDs) are required to provide
daily reports of their derivatives activity to a specific SwapData Repository (SDR) (Cadmus, 2012). In addition,MSPs
and SDs are required to provide real-time reporting, for whichmany institutions have decided to use the services of
Derivatives Clearing Organizations (DCOs).
Cadmus (2012) as well as Greenberger (2013) raise the concern of the potential systemic importance of these
DCOs, saying that a collapse of a DCO could jeopardize the soundness and stability of the entire financial system. Both
Cadmus and Greenberger argue that regulators should focus onmaking sure that the access to the clearing market
stays open
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